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Executive Summary 
Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG), South Korea, introduced the Shared 
Property Tax System in 2008 in order to mitigate fiscal disparities among twenty five 
autonomous districts located in its jurisdiction. The new program, introduced at the end 
of a long controversy, was influenced by St. Paul-Minneapolis (Twin Cities) 
Metropolitan Area Fiscal Disparities Program in Minnesota. 
I examine two questions in my capstone project: (1) whether the program has 
increased fiscal capacity1 of each district over the last five years as policy makers 
expected, and (2) whether the program of the SMG has contributed to relieve fiscal 
disparities among localities. 
To examine the research questions, I utilized the Standard Financial Needs 
Satisfaction Index (SNFSI)2, based upon the amount of property tax collections of 
twenty five localities and the impact over ten years from FY2003 to FY2012, measuring 
the program five years before and after introduction of the program, in order to assess 
the outcomes of the program. The data were collected from the Budget Office, the 
Administration Bureau, and the Finance Bureau of SMG via its official website or 
personal contact with officials in charge. I used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model. 
In the model, dependent variables are absolute values of the Z-scores of SFNSI and 
property tax revenue of each district in each year and explanatory variables are program, 
population, and total general fund. 
The results of my analysis indicate that the differences in amounts of property 
tax collections between twenty five localities have been reduced since the program was 
introduced in 2008. In addition, the index of financial capacity, SFNSI, was improved 
in poorer localities over the duration of the study. In respect to wealthier localities, net 
contributors to the pool sources, the SFNSIs have decreased by a minimal amount.  
                                           
1 The ability of a district government to finance resources for its spending for public services. 
2 An administrative term used by the Seoul Metropolitan Government. It is used to measure localities’ 
financial capacity in performing basic administration. 
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Background 
There are twenty five autonomous districts in the Seoul metropolitan area and 
each district has a different size of jurisdiction area, population, fiscal capacity, and 
political background. One of the most important financial issues of Seoul has been the 
fiscal disparities among the districts (see Figure 1). The fiscal gaps have increased and 
exacerbated fiscal problems in the poorer districts due to the constituents’ demand for 
social welfare services.  
Figure1. Local Tax Collection per capita in Seoul, 2006 
 
Source: The Seoul Institute (2007, p.97) 
 
A financial imbalance causes inequality in welfare and public service and 
promotes an atmosphere of social disharmony between wealthy and poor regional 
residents in Seoul. This impedes balanced regional development. Due to this disparity, 
the city government is actively searching for remedies to promote equality in regional 
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development. One such proposed solution in the debate surrounding this issue was a 
swap of tax items between taxing authorities, Seoul city, and district governments, 
thereby creating a tax sharing system over a property tax, which has been present since 
2006 (Lee 2012).  
Seoul city government has acted continuously to eliminate or mitigate this gap 
and keep the balance across the districts in its jurisdiction. This is because the city 
government is responsible for providing quality public goods and services for its 
citizenry regardless of their residential locations. Furthermore, the city government has 
authority and accountability to adjust the fiscal status of autonomous districts by using 
intergovernmental grants or special subsidies. 
Property Tax in Seoul 
In South Korea, property tax has traditionally been a local tax and the levy 
authority of this tax belongs to only district governments, which is the lowest level of a 
three-tier governmental system of the country. Even though the Korean Constitution 
authorizes local governments to impose property tax, it also states that tax rates must be 
prescribed through law enacted by National Assembly. Therefore, in South Korea, all 
local taxes are controlled by laws enacted by the National Assembly and most of the 
laws are equally applied across the country (Park, 2007).  
Property tax is levied on the real estate, land, buildings, airplanes, and vessels. 
Tax rates vary depending on taxable items and assessed values. As with most other 
countries, the property tax is a primary source of revenue for the district governments in 
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Seoul. In the 2012 fiscal year3, the property tax revenues of all twenty five districts 
totaled 1.673 trillion Korean Won (KRW)4 and accounted for 83.1 percent of tax 
revenues and 21.8 percent of total general funds of all district governments. 
 
Table1 the Components of Twenty Five-District Governments Revenues (FY2012) 
(In billions, KRW) 
Own Resources Intergovernmental Transfers 
Total 
District taxes 
Non-Tax 
Revenue 
Subtotal 
National 
Government 
Seoul City 
Government 
Subtotal 
Property tax
Other 
taxes 
Subtotal 
(%) 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1,673 339 2,012 1,515 3,527 1,283 2,851 4,134 7,661
21.8% 4.4% 26.3% 19.8% 46.0% 16.7% 37.2% 54.0% 100.0%
Source: The Budget Office of Seoul Metropolitan Government (2012) 
 
Fiscal Disparities in Seoul 
Roy Bahl (1994) explains the concept of the metropolitan fiscal disparities as 
“resource-requirements gap between revenues, including own sources, federal aid, and 
state aid, and expenditures required to produce a ‘standard’ package of local public 
services.” He explains that each level of government should play a role in achieving the 
financial balance among the central cities and the other regions in the metropolitan area.  
Previously, there had been a large property tax receipts gap among districts of 
the city of Seoul before the introduction of the Shared Property Tax System in 2008 
                                           
3 The fiscal year starts on January 1 and ends December 31 in South Korea.  
4 The exchange rate of Korean won against USD is 1,087 KRW (Nov. 8, 2012). When it is converted into 
the USD, becomes 1.539 billion dollars. 
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(see Table 2). For example, the ratio of the annual amount of property tax receipts of the 
richest Gangnam-gu district to the poorest Gangbuk-gu district was 15-1 in fiscal year 
2007.  
Table 2 Budget of District Governments Fiscal Year 2007 
(In millions, KRW, except Budget per capita) 
  Average Highest Lowest 
Budget 213,686 369,440 166,580 
(General Funds)  Gangnam-gu Geumcheon-gu 
Budget/capita 
(in thousands, KRW) 
525 1,577 384 
   Jung-gu Gwanak-gu 
Standard Financial Needs  58.10% 197.90% 26.50% 
Satisfaction Index  Gangnam-gu Jungrang-gu 
Financial Independence  50.50% 90.50% 28.30% 
Degree  Seocho-gu Gwanak-gu 
Local Tax Receipts 62,136 301,425 18,304 
   Gangnam-gu Gangbuk-gu 
Property Tax Receipts 52,593 252,484 16,984 
   Gangnam-gu Gangbuk-gu 
Source: the Budget Office of SMG (2007) 
 
 
In this sense, even though Seoul is divided into twenty five autonomous 
districts, Seoul city government has supervising authority in administrative affairs 
delegated to the district governments. This, in turn, places responsibility on the city 
government in sharing the financial burden in the other affairs such as a free school 
meal program. Moreover, Seoul city government is responsible for balanced 
development and equal benefits for its citizens’ welfare regardless of their regional 
districts in its metropolitan area. 
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Definitions 
Standard Financial Needs Satisfaction Index (SFNSI) 
The SFNSI is a measure of the fiscal power of twenty five autonomous districts 
and estimated by Seoul City Government according to the Seoul Metropolitan 
Government (SMG) Ordinance on Adjustment of Local Governments’ Financial 
Resources. The standard financial needs of each locality are calculated by measuring 
twenty one factors. The SMG uses the SFNSI as an indicator for determining the 
amount of subsidies for all localities in Seoul every year.  
The index is computed using the following formula:  
SFNSI = Revenue for Standard Financial Needs
5 ´  100 
Expenditure for Standard Financial Needs6  
 
Shared Property Tax System of Seoul City Government 
The Shared Property Taxation System was introduced in 2008 after vigorous 
political dispute between wealthy and poor districts. Seoul City Government collects 50 
percent of property tax revenue amassed by all the district governments and the accrued 
tax revenues pooled into a single fund. In other words, the city government and a single 
district government share property tax revenue equally, 50 percent respectively. Then 
the city government equally redistributes the pool to twenty five district governments. 
                                           
5 It includes 1) own resources, tax and non-tax revenues, 2) local subsidy from national government, and 
3) local fiscal compensations from the SMG. 
6 It calculated by twenty one measurements including population, aging population, the number of 
infants and preschoolers, road size, the number of civil servants, the number local council members, low-
income families, and so forth 
8 
 
The redistributed tax revenue is regarded as its own revenue by the Local Tax Act, 
which is determined by the following formula 
A locality i’s Share = 
∑Di  
25 
- ∑Di = The pool, sum of property tax revenue collected from 25 districts. The contributed 
ratio of each district is 50 percent. 
This system was enacted through the amendment of the Local Tax Act by the 
National Assembly and it applies solely to the Seoul Metropolitan area. This act differs 
from the norm in Korean law as it only applies to a specific set of districts, where the 
majority of legislative mandates are implemented nationally. 
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Literature Review 
 There is a significant amount of literature on a tax base sharing and fiscal 
disparities among urban areas but the following is an overview of the system in the 
United States and a summary of a specific case in the state of Minnesota. This literature 
review concentrates on the Minnesota and Seoul cases as they are representative of 
property tax base examples while other cases in the literature discuss a sales tax base.  
Overview of Tax Base Sharing System in the United States 
There are only two areas in the United States, the Twin Cities of Minnesota and 
the Meadowlands of New Jersey, where a large-scale property tax base sharing has been 
enacted (New York State Commission, 2008). In the other models, some local 
governments levy other taxes besides the property tax, such as sales or income taxes. 
Table 3 provides a summary of models of sharing revenue system in the United States. 
There are two main goals that the policy makers intend to accomplish from the 
tax base sharing systems: 1) to increase equity between wealthy and poor communities 
in the distribution of fiscal resources; and 2) to diminish inter-municipal competition for 
economic development by promoting a higher degree of regional coordination for land 
use and infrastructure planning. (OPM, CT, 2010, p.9) 
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Table 3 Summary of Models of Regional Revenue Sharing7 
 Hackensack 
Meadowlands, 
NJ 
Twin Cities, 
MN 
 
Montgomery 
County, OH 
Monroe 
County, NY 
Purpose 
 
To compensate 
municipalities 
for impacts of 
land use 
decisions  
To reduce fiscal 
disparities  
 
To reduce fiscal 
disparities  
 
To reduce fiscal 
disparities  
 
Funding 
Sources  
 
Fourteen 
member 
municipalities 
contribute 40% 
of their post-
1970 baseline 
share of property 
taxes to a 
common pool  
40% of the  
increase in 
Commercial-
Industrial 
property 
assessment goes 
into a pool  
 
Increased sales 
tax by 0.5% for 
economic 
development and 
county-wide 
growth 
contribution rate 
for government 
equity  
4% local sales 
tax  
 
Funding 
Distribution  
 
Each 
municipality 
receives 
compensation for 
its share of 
school students 
and its 
percentage of 
land relative to 
the region‘s total, 
while a 
stabilization 
factor caps 
annual 
fluctuations at 
5%  
Based on 
formula that 
takes into 
consideration the 
jurisdiction‘s 
population and 
fiscal capacity  
 
70% from tax 
increase 
earmarked for 
economic 
development; 
Government 
equity funds are 
distributed  
 
Approximately 
50% to city; 25% 
to county; 
remaining 25% 
distributed by 
formula to city, 
towns, villages 
and suburban 
 
Source: the Office of Policy and Management, CT (2010, p.10) 
                                           
7 The table is cited from “ A Review of Regional Tax-Based Revenue Sharing Programs and the 
Establishment of Regional Asset Districts” http://www.ct.gov/opm/lib/opm/igp/org/final_rrs-
rad_report_7-13-10.pdf 
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Twin Cities, Minnesota 
Program Implementation 
The most well-known tax base sharing program in the US is Twin cities 
program. The “Charles R. Weaver Metropolitan Revenue Distribution Act” was enacted 
in 1971. The program has two main goals8: 1) promoting more orderly regional 
development and 2) improving equity in the distribution of fiscal resources. The 
program was an innovative attempt to address growing fiscal concerns within the 
seven‐county, two city region, including both Minneapolis and St. Paul (see Figure 2). 
There are over 180 cities and townships; over 60 school districts; and dozens of other 
taxing authorities in the region. (TischlerBise’s Report, 2012)9  
According to the Metropolitan Council, “under the fiscal disparities program, 
taxing jurisdictions in the seven-county area contribute 40 percent of the growth in 
commercial-industrial (CI) property tax base since 1971 into an area-wide shared pool. 
Shared tax base is then redistributed back to jurisdictions - reducing fiscal disparities” 
(cited from the web of the Metropolitan Council, MN). Distribution of the pool is based 
on population and the value of all property relative to the metro average. If a locality 
has a smaller per capita property value compared to the metro average, the locality 
receives a larger distribution than it contributes. In contrast, a locality with a larger per 
                                           
8 More details can be found in Minnesota Statutes 473F at 
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=473F.01 
9 The report was prepared for Minnesota Department of Revenue by a consultant firm, Feb., 2012, 
 http://www.revenue.state.mn.us/propertytax/reports/fiscal-disparities-study-full-report.pdf 
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capita property value compared to the average, receives a smaller distribution from the 
pool (cited from the web of the Metropolitan Council, MN).10 
Figure 2 Fiscal Disparities Geographic Area: Seven-County Twin Cities  
Metropolitan Area 
 
Source: the House Research Department, MN (2005, p.3) 
All of taxing the authorities in Twin Cities contributes 40 percent of growth in 
CI property tax base in each year, compared to year the baseline year of 1971. “The 
growth in CI value is defined as the change in net tax capacity since 1971 including new 
construction, inflation, demolition, revaluation, appreciation, and depreciation. CI 
property includes all businesses, offices, stores, factories etc, as well as personal 
property” (Buhrer, et al., 2007). 
                                           
10 The Metropolitan Council, MN, http://www.metrocouncil.org/metroarea/FiscalDisparities/index.html 
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Impact and Evaluation of the Program 
According to The Metropolitan Council (2012), shared tax base totaled $390 
million for taxes payable in 2012 and denoted 37.3 percent of the total CI tax base. The 
reported base indicates that the shared percent of CI tax base has increased from 6.7 
percent in 1975 and the total tax base is up 12 percent from 2.1 percent in 1975.  
Figure 3 indicates changes in shared tax base. Each line shows percentage 
shares of metro area CI tax base and total tax base from 1975 to 2012.11 
 
Figure 3 Fiscal Disparities Shared Tax Base in Twin Cities 
– Taxes Payable 1975-2012 
 
Source: Cited from the Metropolitan Council, MN (2012, p.11). 
                                           
11 Cited from “ Fiscal Disparities in the Twin Cities” (Metropolitan Council, Oct. 2012,p10-11)” at 
http://www.metrocouncil.org/metroarea/FiscalDisparities/FDInfo.pdf 
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When it comes to the result of redistribution of the shared area-wide pool of tax 
base, 113 jurisdictions receive more tax base than they contribute. And 63 communities 
contribute more tax base than they take back. For communities with population greater 
than 10,000, the ratio of highest to lowest CI tax base is narrowed from 10 to 1 without 
the program, to 3 to 1 with program in 2012 (the Metropolitan council, 2012).  
In an early stage of the program, the Twin cities program was evaluated (Fisher, 
1982) as to whether it had accomplished its goal of improving regional efficiency; 
through this evaluation it was determined that the overarching goal was not achieved 
across the jurisdictions. The author highlights that “the Twin cities formula produces 
results that are weak in aspect of effective overall redistribution and that contain lots of 
anomalies. In some suburbs with wealthiest in terms of taxable property gain even more 
tax base, while some communities relatively poor in terms of fiscal resources are 
required to contribute part of those resources to the pool.”  
On the other hand, Orfield (1999) argues that the Twin cities program “creates 
greater regional equity among cities and counties in the provision of public services, 
while preserving local autonomy.” He also cites that the program fosters balanced 
regional localities due to its broad design, imposes property tax on CI at a consistent 
regional rate, and allows for the narrowing of business tax-rate disparities among 
municipalities (Orfield, 2007).  
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The Shared Property Taxation System in Seoul 
There have been many studies and debates over the change of the local taxation 
system among scholars and/or local governments. Those studies examined various 
alternatives. One of the alternatives is that a tax is not influenced by regional wealth, 
e.g., tobacco consumption tax, should be turned to district tax whereas a property tax 
should be turned to metropolitan tax. Another alternative is property tax sharing (Choi, 
2011). 
In terms of the effect of the shared property tax system, Choi, et al., (2009) 
maintain that the system has not accomplished its goal in diminishing fiscal disparities 
among localities. The authors assert that because the system has an equal distribution 
system, it cannot reflect both the difference in autonomous revenues and the cost 
differentials of public service provisions among districts.  
Different from Choi, et al., (2009) analysis, Choi (2011) observes that before 
the introduction of the shared tax system in terms of property tax revenues accrued by 
municipalities, the ratio of the wealthiest Gangnam-gu to the poorest Gangbuk-gu was 
17.1 to 1. However, after the introduction of the shared tax system, the ratio has 
narrowed to 6.0 to 1, showing some improvement. The ratio subsequently has continued 
to narrow as indicated by 5.7 to 1 in 2009 and 4.7 to 1 in 2010, indicating that the fiscal 
revenue imbalances among the localities has been significantly mitigated by this 
program (Choi 2011). 
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Research Design 
 The null hypothesis (H0) is that the shared property tax system in Seoul has 
no effect on the district governments’ fiscal capacity and the alternative hypothesis (H1) 
is that the system has an effect on the district governments’ fiscal capacity. To test the 
null hypotheses, I analyzed ten years of budget data and property tax revenues of the 
twenty five districts of the Seoul metropolitan area from 2003 to 2012.  
 H0 = the shared property tax system has no effect on the district 
governments’ fiscal capacity. 
 H1 = the shared property tax system effect on the district governments’ fiscal 
capacity. 
Data 
 I collected data from the Budget Office and the Bureau of Finance of the 
Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) via the official website of the SMG.12 This 
data set includes information on each district government’s characteristics, the 
corresponding property tax revenue, SFNSI, etc., from 2003 to 2012. The data were 
organized by district and year (25 districts over ten years) totaling 250 observations per 
variable. Table Four explains the definitions and summary statistics of the dependent 
and explanatory variables (p. 22).  
                                           
12 http://finance.seoul.go.kr/ 
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Methodology  
In a number of previous studies, researchers employed coefficient of variation 
and equalization index for an analysis determining the effect of revenues which are 
influenced by a financial policy. In my research, I use coefficients of variation and an 
OLS regression model to understand the relationship between and impact of the shared 
property tax system on the localities’ public finance.  
First, I calculated the coefficients of variation (CV) of the Standard Financial 
Needs Satisfaction Index (SFNSI) and the property tax revenues to examine trends for 
ten years by using the following formula.   
Coefficient of Variation (CV):  
CV = 
 t 
σt 
- Where: 
-  t is an average of SNFSI or property tax revenue of all districts in each year  
- σt is a standard deviation of SNFSI or property tax revenue of all districts each 
year 
Second, I employed a pooled regression model to measure the impact of the 
shared tax program, especially the financial equalization of the district governments. To 
do so, I generated two sets of Z-scores based upon the SFNSI and total property tax 
revenue of each district in each year. I used the absolute values of the Z-scores as 
dependent variables in two regression models outlined below. 
｜Z｜-score: 
｜Zit｜  = 
｜( it- t)｜  
σt 
- ｜Z｜-score is absolute value of Z-score of district i in year t. 
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-   is a SFNSI or total property tax revenue of district i in year t. 
-  t is an average of 25 districts’ SFNSI or total property tax revenue in year t. 
- σt is a standard deviation of SFNSI or total property tax revenue of 25 districts 
in year t. 
 
When I used the intact Z-scores, they had negative or positive values, offsetting 
each other and I could not measure exactly how far the variables were spread from the 
mean. In other words, all that is necessary for data analysis is how the data are spread 
from the mean in a distribution chart. If an absolute Z-score is large, it means that data 
are spread wider from the mean and it implies increased fiscal disparity. Similarly, if the 
Z-score is small, the gap of the data is also small. Therefore, I can estimate whether 
fiscal disparities among districts are reduced or not by using an absolute Z-score. 
I set the pooled regression model as follows: 
Model 1)  Y1= β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 +β3X3 + ɛ 
Model 2)  Y2= β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 +β3X3 + ɛ 
Where: 
- Y1= The absolute values of Z score of SFNSI  
- Y2 = The absolute values of Z score of property tax revenue  
- X1= Program dummy determined 1 or 0 by the program implemented or not  
- X2 = Population of the district 
- X3= Total general fund of the district 
Finally, I generated five interactions for further analysis. Through the pooled 
regression model, the average impact of the program can be determined based upon the 
fiscal capacity during the last five years. In addition, I examine the yearly impact of the 
shared property tax system.  
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For this analysis I implemented the following regression models: 
Model 3)  Y1 = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + PY2008 +PY2009+PY2010+ PY2011 
+ PY2012 + ɛ 
Model 4) Y2 = β0 +β1X1 +β2X2 + PY2008 +PY2009+PY2010+ PY2011 
+ PY2012 + ɛ 
- Y1 = Absolute values of Z score of SFNSI  
- Y2 = Absolute values of Z score of property tax revenue 
- X1 = Population of the district 
- X2 = Total general fund of the district 
- PY2008 to PY2012 = interaction of program dummy and each year’s dummy 
Table Four (below) provides a description of the variables used in all four models. 
Table 4 Variable Description 
Variable1 Description Source 
Z-Score of SFNSI2 Absolute values of the SFNSI calculated 
by the Z-score formula, Z = ( - )/σ 
Computed by the 
author 
Z-score of property tax 
revenues2 
Absolute values of the SFNSI calculated 
by the Z-score formula, Z = ( - )/σ 
Computed by the 
author 
Population Population of each district www.seoul.go.kr 
Total general Fund Total general fund of each district, in 
millions Korean won 
www.seoul.go.kr 
Total property tax revenues Total property tax revenue of each year 
of all district, in millions Korean won 
www.seoul.go.kr 
Program The program is implemented or not, 
dummy variable. Years with the 
program are 1 and without the program 
are 0 
 
PY2008, PY2009, PY2010, 
PY2011 , and PY20123 
The program is implemented or not at 
each year.  The data generated by the 
formula “program ´ year” from 2008 to 
2012. 
 
1. Each variable has 250 observations. 
2. Two Z-scores are dependent variables and the others are independent variables. 
3. In variables PY2008 to PY2012, each variable is determined 0 or 1.For example, in PY2008, the 
data in the year 2008 is given 1, and those in the other years are given 0. 
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Results 
Table Five provides the summary statistics of SFNSI through the trends of the 
change of data, mean, min, and max of SFNSI during last 10 years. From fiscal year 
2008, the year of program implementation, the mean and min increase somewhat and 
the CV has decreased.  
Table 5: Summary Statistics of Standard Financial Needs Satisfaction Index (SFNSI) 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Mean (%)  58.3  64.0  63.5  59.4   56.7   74.3   77.2    70.8    68.9    65.9 
 Min (%)   30.8  32.9  30.8  26.3   26.5   42.3   48.6    45.3   49.2   39.7 
 Max (%) 191.1 237.2 252.4 196.6 197.9 223.4 224.0 176.7 143.3 173.6 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
0.67 0.76 0.80 0.70 0.70 0.57 0.51 0.45 0.32 0.43 
Standard 
Deviation 
39.2 48.6 51.1 41.4 39.8 42.1 39.4 31.9 22.0 28.2 
Figure 4 is a visual presentation of the statistics outlined in Table Five, 
illustrating the degree to which the gap between max and min has been reduced after 
2008. 
Figure 4: Time Trends of the Mean, Min and Max of SFNSI (percent: %) 
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Table 6 provides the property tax revenue statistics. In these statistics, the 
increasing means are not statistically significant because these values are influenced by 
other variables including rise the value of taxable items. However, the decrease of the 
CV implies that a reduction of fiscal disparities among the localities has occurred since 
2008.  
Table 6 Summary Statistics of Property Tax Revenue 
(In billions, KRW) 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 Mean    31    41    37    42    53    63    61    64    67    70 
 Min    13    15    14    15    17    36    39    41    43    46 
 Max   131   184   183   192   252   221   188   200   202   207 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
0.87  0.91  0.96  0.91  0.99  0.65  0.52  0.54  0.52  0.50 
Standard 
Deviation  
27   37   36   38    52   41   32  34 34 35 
Note: Data showing from 2003 to 2011 are accrued tax revenues, 2012 is levied amount in September 
2012. 
 
 Like SFNSI, in property tax revenue, the intervals between the maximum and 
minimum values, along with the mean and minimum have been reduced since 2008. 
Figure 5 Trends of Mean, Min and Max of Property Tax Revenue (in billions) 
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Most previous researchers use CV or a population weighted CV to measure 
fiscal disparities or regional inequality. The CV of SFNSI was calculated along this best 
practice along with the property tax revenues over 10 years. Although Tables 5 and 6 
already numerically list the resulting summary statistics, I review them through Figure 6, 
which shows that the CV has been decreased since 2008. 
Figure 6 Coefficient of Variation of SFNSI and Property Revenue 
 
 
Table 7 shows that the program has a significant influence on the SFNSI
 dispersion based upon regression model one. In other words, the program narro
ws the intervals of the SFNSI between the twenty-five districts, which can be de
termined by measuring the distance of the z-scores close up from the mean on t
he dispersion graph. Therefore, the program variable is statistically significant at 
a 0.01 level of significance. 
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In my regression models, I employ population and total general fund as 
independent variables. This is because these two particular variables may endogenously 
influence the dependent variables. To control for this, two additional variables were 
employed in the model to control for this. Table 7 and Table 8 show the program 
impacts on improving fiscal equalization among district governments. 
Table 7 Results of Model 1 and Model 2 
Dependent 
Variable :  
1)Absolute values of Z score of the Standard 
Financial Needs Satisfaction Index 
2)Absolute values of Z score of the 
property tax revenue 
Independent 
Variable 
Coefficient t Score p value Coefficient t Score p value 
Program  -.969*** -10.05 0.000 -.944*** -8.65 0.000 
Population -.00000224*** -6.80 0.000 -.00000078** -2.11 0.036 
Total general 
Fund  
.00000931*** 13.72 0.000 .00000887*** 11.55 0.000 
Constant -.4826496 -3.46 0.001 -1.043 -6.61 0.000 
Observations 250 250 
R-squared 0.437 0.404 
Adj R-squared 0.430 0.397 
***Significant at the 0.01 level, **Significant at the 0.05 level, and *Significant at the 0.1 level. 
 
Finally, Table 8 displays the results of the regression analyses using Models 
Three and Four, which indicate the impact of the program each year since its 
introduction. The coefficients seem to reach a peak at PY2009 and then decline after 
that point. The results imply that overall, the program has mitigated fiscal disparities 
among the districts but it has been decreasing gradually over time. However, it has been 
declined gradually from 2010. 
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Table 8 Results of Model 3 and Model 4 
Dependent 
Variable :  
3) Absolute values of Z score of the 
Standard Financial Needs Satisfaction 
Index 
4) Absolute values of Z score of the 
property tax revenue 
Independent 
Variable 
Coefficient t Score p value Coefficient t Score p value 
Population -.00000256*** -7.9 0.000 -.00000111*** -2.98 0.000 
Total general 
Fund  
.0000104*** -15.03 0.000 .00000997*** 12.57 0.003 
PY2008 -.9369056*** -7.40 0.000 -.9150122*** -6.32 0.000 
PY2009 -1.521227*** -10.17 0.000 -1.472835*** -8.61 0.000 
PY2010 -1.110686*** -8.29 0.000 -1.122728*** -7.32 0.000 
PY2011 -.9378667*** -7.36 0.000 -.9443611*** -6.48 0.000 
PY2012 -.9079365*** -7.33 0.000 -.8341392*** -5.88 0.000 
Constant -.5999811*** -4.40 0.000 -1.160104*** -7.43 0.000 
Observations 250 250 
R-squared .486 .444 
Adj R-squared .471 .428 
***Significant at the 0.01 level, **significant at the 0.05 level, *significant at the 0.1 level. 
 
By the aforementioned results, I reject the null hypothesis that the shared 
property tax system in Seoul has no effect on the district governments’ fiscal capacity. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The results of the regression analyses show that the gap of the SFNSI and the 
amount of property tax revenue between the richest and poorest localities has narrowed 
since 2008. Appendix Two provides an overview of all twenty-five districts, 
demonstrating how fiscal power (represented by SFNSI) has increased in most localities 
during the last five years. Net contributors are the six richest districts and the remaining 
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19 districts are net recipients (see Appendix 3). Exploring the relationships present in 
the four regression analyses employed, it would seem that property tax sharing has 
contributed to reducing fiscal disparities among districts and to improving localities’ 
fiscal power in Seoul metropolitan area, all else constant. This study affords broad 
support to previous studies conducted on the topic.  
Buhrer, et al., (2007) suggested three policy options in considering the 
implementation of a tax base sharing program to achieve the goals of intergovernmental 
cooperation. The main idea of the three suggestions is that the “…adoption and 
enforcement of a tax base sharing system should be on a statewide basis rather than 
local.” In this sense, the Seoul system has a high likelihood of success and stable system 
due to the support of national law and a metropolitan government directed policy. 
This is not an exhaustive study which includes all resources funded to district 
governments. This limitation exists because a district government is funded by various 
sources, own revenues (tax and non-tax), and intergovernmental transfers (city and 
national government). Moreover, intergovernmental transfers are a very complicated 
system so the study was limited to the property tax revenue. In addition, the 
methodology behind the collection of the pooled sources and their distribution to the 
contributing local governments was not assessed in this study. This is a critical issue to 
the program and can be examined in a further professional research. Also, in the present 
study, it would seem that additional variables should be included in models three and 
four in order to better explain the impact of equalization since 2010 in Seoul. 
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Appendix 1 Basic Information about the Localities in Seoul 
 
   (Dec.31,2011) 
District Population 
The Number 
of 
Households 
Area 
(㎢) 
The 
Number 
of  
Public 
Servants 
FY 2012 Budget(in Millions KRW) 
2012 
 FID  
 2012  
SFNSI General 
Fund 
Special 
Funds 
Total 
Jongno   168,382     76,688 23.9   1,165  216,717   28,719   245,437  65.7  73.2 
Jung   133,193     61,475 10.0   1,211  238,128   26,745   264,873  76.9 121.4 
Yongsan  246,501    112,617 21.9   1,174  225,970   28,318   254,288  61.6  74.9 
Seongdong   300,711    126,148 16.9   1,176  266,236   14,474   280,709  50.4  59.5 
Gwangjin  371,936   158,472 17.1  1,109  255,778  13,329  269,107  37.7  51.0 
Dongdaemun   365,486  157,823  14.2  1,223  298,000   32,018   330,018  41.6  56.6 
Jungrang   423,706   175,115 18.5  1,179  307,657  17,236   324,893  30.7 49.8 
Seongbuk  485,171   199,398 24.6   1,327  343,513   23,624   367,138  33.4  47.5 
Gangbuk  345,054   142,527 23.6   1,122  282,582   9,156  291,739  29.6 48.2 
Dobong   365,573   139,348 20.7  1,078 266,153  5,840  271,993  30.1 47.4 
Nowon  603,930  225,104  35.4  1,311  422,300  12,173   434,474  22.7  39.7 
Eunpyeong  493,634   197,582 29.7 1,197  340,000   11,616   351,616  30.9   51.3 
Seodaemun   314,852   134,730 17.6  1,178 266,000   9,059   275,059  40.8 53.2 
Mapo   389,493   168,640 23.8  1,260 279,281  51,550   330,832  49.1 65.8 
Yangcheon  500,210   182,677 17.4   1,209 332,004   16,621  348,625  39.0  51.6 
Gangseo  569,072 223,490  41.4   1,313 391,059   23,421   414,480  33.1 56.1 
Guro  427,468   171,064 20.1  1,173  311,198  9,127 320,325  36.8 51.6 
Geumcheon  243,438  103,600  13.0   1,064 242,454   8,614  251,067  42.2 61.8 
Yeongdeungpo  397,443    168,850 24.6 1,283  299,600  32,745   332,345  56.2 73.1 
Dongjak   401,408   167,099 16.4   1,213  274,871   10,727   285,598  44.4   60.0 
Gwanak   526,397  246,979  29.6   1,293  333,536   18,589   352,125  34.0  49.8 
Seocho  433,564   168,988 47.0  1,295  278,550   44,402   322,951  81.5 91.0 
Gangnam  565,710   231,983 39.5  1,400 504,426   58,566  562,992  80.5 173.6 
Songpa 682,209   261,963 33.9  1,400  381,517   39,293   420,810  63.3  77.8 
Gangdong 495,138    190,392 24.6   1,192  303,467   26,177   329,643  44.2   60.8 
Total 10,249,679  4,192,752  605.1    30,545  7,660,996   572,139  8,233,135     -      - 
Average   409,987    167,710 24.2   1,222  306,440   22,886   329,325  46.3  65.9 
 
Source: The Budget Office of Seoul Metropolitan Government 
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Appendix 2 Standard Financial Needs Satisfaction Index (FY2003~2012) 
 
(Percent: %) 
District 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Jongno 83.6 88.8 82.4 88.4 73.3 88.8 101.0 99.4 85.6 73.2 
Jung 146.3 155.2 144.0 140.6 120.8 137.0 124.1 135.3 112.9 121.4 
Yongsan 49.4 52.4 58.3 53.3 54.1 75.4 81.0 76.5 78.3 74.9 
Seongdong 40.7 39.1 37.5 40.1 41.3 57.1 64.0 59.2 63.1 59.5 
Gwangjin 39.0 38.8 37.4 40.5 39.5 61.3 66.4 59.5 59.3 51.0 
Dongdaemun 39.5 40.7 38.5 37.4 36.7 53.1 59.0 58.1 62.4 56.6 
Jungrang 34.2 32.9 31.1 26.3 26.5 42.3 48.6 45.3 51.7 49.8 
Seongbuk 45.9 46.2 45.1 42.2 37.2 52.1 54.1 51.2 53.2 47.5 
Gangbuk 32.3 33.2 31.4 31.4 26.7 46.6 54.0 47.6 51.6 48.2 
Dobong 34.5 32.9 33.3 34.2 30.2 46.0 51.6 50.3 53.4 47.4 
Nowon 34.3 35.8 33.9 31.3 31.9 44.0 49.6 47.6 49.2 39.7 
Eunpyeong 30.8 35.5 31.9 30.3 27.5 43.2 49.3 48.0 50.6 51.3 
Seodaemun 37.6 38.1 34.4 32.2 34.5 54.4 58.1 53.4 56.7 53.2 
Mapo 41.1 46.1 45.5 48.8 54.0 61.4 64.7 63.1 66.1 65.8 
Yangcheon 47.4 50.6 60.4 57.2 54.8 74.9 70.1 61.1 58.5 51.6 
Gangseo 51.4 57.3 52.9 49.9 45.4 60.8 60.0 58.7 61.9 56.1 
Guro 42.7 40.4 42.1 44.3 39.1 54.0 58.9 57.0 59.1 51.6 
Geumcheon 36.2 35.3 30.8 30.7 32.8 53.7 59.6 54.6 60.7 61.8 
Yeongdeungpo 87.4 95.3 85.0 81.1 79.3 92.6 93.0 85.4 80.2 73.1 
Dongjak 42.9 44.6 43.6 41.0 38.5 54.6 61.9 58.6 64.2 60.0 
Gwanak 37.0 38.8 35.3 34.5 33.5 47.4 53.1 51.2 57.4 49.8 
Seocho 112.1 134.9 146.2 126.5 124.2 148.9 139.3 119.0 100.2 91.0 
Gangnam 191.1 237.2 252.4 196.6 197.9 223.4 224.0 176.7 143.3 173.6 
Songpa 74.6 99.0 101.2 93.9 86.9 115.3 117.0 93.2 78.6 77.8 
Gangdong 45.7 50.3 52.5 52.9 52.1 68.8 66.6 59.8 65.5 60.8 
 
Source: The Administration Bureau of Seoul Metropolitan Government 
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Appendix 3 Property Tax Revenue (FY 2003-2012) 
(in Millions, KRW) 
Name of 
Districts  
 
FY2003  
 
FY2004  
 
FY2005  
 
FY2006  
 
FY2007  
FY2008 (40%) 1 
Total 
(Own 
+Redis.) 
Own 
Redistri
b-uted 
from the 
Pool 
Contrib-
ute to the 
Pool 
Jongno 39,223 51,292  38,137 43,656  52,324 61,336 35,743 25,593 24,851 
Jung 65,519  80,491  51,001 61,785  73,278 73,390 47,797 25,593 32,935 
Yongsan 26,098  34,186 30,842 38,813 50,727 64,842 39,249  25,593 27,093 
Seongdong 16,979  22,542  22,671 26,210  31,155 46,242 20,649  25,593 14,721 
Gwangjin 19,453  25,852  24,004 26,523  34,703 47,690 22,097   25,593  15,809 
Dongdaemun 21,409  25,941  25,109 27,213  31,501 45,585 19,992 25,593 14,304 
Jungrang 14,123  17,376  14,896 16,763  19,254 37,256 11,663    25,593 8,744 
Seongbuk 21,403  27,918  23,184 25,646  30,672 45,255 19,662    25,593 14,103 
Gangbuk 14,335  17,291  13,646 14,740 16,984 35,565 9,972    25,593 7,614 
Dobong 12,709  16,324  16,334 17,688  19,770 37,172 11,579    25,593 8,679 
Nowon 19,642  24,692  25,439 26,697  29,842 44,016 18,423    25,593 13,240 
Eunpyeong 16,165  21,202  18,766 19,373  22,239 38,992 13,399    25,593 9,900 
Seodaemun 16,615  21,456  20,020 22,796  25,932 41,369 15,776    25,593 11,459 
Mapo 22,329  29,811  27,500 34,139 41,830 53,465 27,872    25,593 19,504 
Yangcheon 21,433  31,718 31,607 36,234  47,075 59,508 33,915    25,593 23,719 
Gangseo 28,507  35,788  33,923 38,554  45,851 56,795 31,202    25,593 20,243 
Guro 19,447 24,973  23,889 26,883  31,351 45,762 20,169    25,593 14,418 
Geumcheon 12,875  14,761  14,384 16,658  18,895 36,846 11,253    25,593 8,483 
Yeongdeungpo 43,312  52,058  43,103 50,568 61,741 67,949 42,356    25,593 29,282 
Dongjak 18,215  23,810  21,713 24,509  29,497 44,839 19,246   25,593 13,854 
Gwanak 17,801  22,489 22,698 25,801  30,209 44,573 18,980   25,593 13,600 
Seocho 80,917 101,962  92,368 111,386 149,340 136,211 110,618   25,593 75,044 
Gangnam 131,331 183,773 182,984 191,969 252,484 220,730 195,137  25,593 131,358 
Songpa 55,121 80,177  81,303 88,478 120,570 120,295 94,702  25,593 64,046 
Gangdong 25,666  33,827  36,103 38,894 47,593 58,405 32,812   25,593 22,830 
1. Source: The Bureau of Finance of the Seoul Metropolitan Government 
2. The contribution percent starts from 40 percent in 2008, and had been increased by 5 percent by 
each year up to 50 percent.  
3. Net contributors (contribution money〉distributed money): 6 districts except in 2009 (7 districts), 
in bold  
4. Data of 2003 to 2011 are collected revenues, 2012 is taxed amount.  
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Appendix 3. Property Tax Revenue (FY 2003-2012) - Continued 
(in Millions, KRW) 
Name of 
Districts  
FY2009 (45%) FY2010 (50%) 
 Total 
(Own 
+Redis.)  
 Own  
 
Distribut
ed from 
the Pool  
 
Contribut
e to the 
Pool  
 Total 
(Own 
+Redis.)  
 Own  
 
Distribute
d from the 
Pool  
 
Contribut
e to the 
Pool  
Jongno 62,322 35,773 26,549 27,715 63,039 30,483 32,556 31,760 
Jung 74,787 48,238 26,549 37,846 74,566 42,010 32,556 43,660 
Yongsan 62,722 36,173 26,549 28,184 66,352 33,796 32,556 35,089 
Seongdong 49,163 22,614 26,549 16,790 51,236 18,680 32,556 19,971 
Gwangjin 48,498 21,949 26,549 16,346 50,344 17,788 32,556 19,213 
Dongdaemun 48,750 22,201 26,549 16,477 49,960 17,404 32,556 18,676 
Jungrang 40,769 14,220 26,549 9,912 42,433 9,877 32,556 11,308 
Seongbuk 47,630 21,081 26,549 15,603 49,359 16,803 32,556 18,154 
Gangbuk 39,235 12,686 26,549 8,665 41,280 8,724 32,556 10,062 
Dobong 40,175 13,626 26,549 9,445 42,094 9,538 32,556 10,834 
Nowon 47,436 20,887 26,549 15,378 49,010 16,454 32,556 17,771 
Eunpyeong 42,917 16,368 26,549 11,684 45,334 12,778 32,556 14,157 
Seodaemun 44,063 17,514 26,549 12,629 46,400 13,844 32,556 14,987 
Mapo 55,000 28,451 26,549 21,845 57,946 25,390 32,556 26,633 
Yangcheon 52,655 26,106 26,549 19,950 57,114 24,558 32,556 25,839 
Gangseo 57,534 30,985 26,549 21,784 58,997 26,441 32,556 25,167 
Guro 48,573 22,024 26,549 16,344 50,090 17,534 32,556 18,846 
Geumcheon 40,567 14,018 26,549 9,751 42,984 10,428 32,556 11,718 
Yeongdeungpo 65,849 39,300 26,549 30,617 68,625 36,069 32,556 37,405 
Dongjak 47,360 20,811 26,549 15,324 49,124 16,568 32,556 17,907 
Gwanak 47,611 21,062 26,549 15,512 49,157 16,601 32,556 17,917 
Seocho 113,231 86,682 26,549 70,164  121,577 89,021 32,556 90,717 
Gangnam 187,863 161,314 26,549 131,926  200,250 167,694 32,556 168,854 
Songpa 101,370 74,821 26,549 60,309 109,516 76,960 32,556 78,186 
Gangdong 57,296 30,747 26,549 23,529   60,271 27,715 32,556 29,075 
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Appendix 3 Property Tax Revenue (FY 2003-2012) - Continued 
(in Millions, KRW) 
Name of 
Districts  
FY2011 (50%) FY2012 (50%) 
 Total 
(Own 
+Redis.)  
 Own  
 
Redistributed 
from the 
Pool  
 Contribute 
to the Pool  
 Total 
(Own 
+Redis.)  
 Own  
 
Distribute
d from 
the Pool  
 Contribute 
to the Pool  
Jongno 65,292 32,082     33,210 32,086 69,684 34,625 35,059 34,613 
Jung 77,779 44,569     33,210 44,551 82,344 47,285 35,059 47,311 
Yongsan 70,188 36,978     33,210 36,978 74,609 39,550 35,059 39,523 
Seongdong 53,752 20,542    33,210 20,545 57,732 22,673 35,059 22,667 
Gwangjin 53,024 19,814     33,210 19,810 56,301 21,242 35,059 21,240 
Dongdaemun 52,569 19,359     33,210 19,321 55,531 20,472 35,059 20,454 
Jungrang 44,930 11,720     33,210 11,721 47,685 12,626 35,059 12,619 
Seongbuk 52,091 18,881     33,210 18,880 55,373 20,314 35,059 20,306 
Gangbuk 43,400 10,190     33,210 10,185 45,842 10,783 35,059 10,778 
Dobong 44,043 10,833     33,210 10,831 46,424 11,365 35,059 11,379 
Nowon 51,389 18,179     33,210 18,175 53,864 18,805 35,059 18,829 
Eunpyeong 48,319 15,109     33,210 15,110 51,589 16,530 35,059 16,530 
Seodaemun 48,306 15,096     33,210 15,117 51,108 16,049 35,059 16,045 
Mapo 61,524 28,314     33,210 28,224 65,825 30,766 35,059 30,675 
Yangcheon 59,492 26,282     33,210 26,305 62,284 27,225 35,059 27,220 
Gangseo 60,992 27,782     33,210 25,151 64,955 29,896 35,059 28,074 
Guro 52,443 19,233     33,210 19,255 56,344 21,285 35,059 21,359 
Geumcheon 46,158 12,948     33,210 12,905 48,772 13,713 35,059 13,737 
Yeongdeungpo 70,823 37,613     33,210 37,564 74,632 39,573 35,059 39,554 
Dongjak 51,928 18,718     33,210 18,717 55,220 20,161 35,059 20,159 
Gwanak 51,445 18,235     33,210 18,232 54,432 19,373 35,059 19,369 
Seocho 126,107 92,897     33,210 92,888 134,677 99,618 35,059 99,170 
Gangnam 201,702 168,492     33,210 168,488 207,466 172,407 35,059 172,344 
Songpa 112,553 79,343     33,210 79,275 116,021 80,962 35,059 80,946 
Gangdong 63,161 29,951     33,210 29,944 66,637 31,578 35,059 31,573 
 
